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Abstract. We offer a formal treatment of the semantics of both com-
plete and incomplete mistrustful or distrustful information transmissions.
The semantics of such relations is analysed in view of rules that define
the behaviour of a receiving agent. We justify this approach in view
of human agent communications and secure system design. We further
specify some properties of such relations.
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1 Introduction
Social epistemology, philosophy of computing, logic, game and network theories,
software design are just some of the disciplines that have been struggling with
the most elusive and, at the same time, interesting, epistemic concept of trust.
Approaches to this notion are diverse in context, techniques and conceptual un-
derstanding.3 Trust has a variety of possible interpretations from a psycholog-
ical and sociological perspective, see e.g. Rotter (1971); Lewis, Weigert (1985);
Shapiro (1987).4 From an epistemic viewpoint, its definition can be qualified
in view of companion notions as those of practical value, testimony, expertise,
integrity, and it obviously has a huge relevance on the philosophical debate on
knowledge, see e.g. Dalton (2001); Faulkner (2012); De Winter, Kosolosky (2012);
Kosolosky (forthcoming); De Winter, Kosolosky (2013); Hardwig (1991); Audi
(1997). From a formal viewpoint, part of the debate revolves around the differ-
ence in identifying trust as a first-order relation between agents (‘agent A trusts
agent B’ ) or as a second-order property of relations (‘relation X between agent
A and agent B is trustworthy’ ) and on that basis to determine the relevant
formal structure, see e.g. Castelfranchi (2004); Demolombe (2004); Dastani et
al. (2004); Herzig et al. (2010); Kramer er al. (2012); Primiero, Taddeo (2012).
3 For a genealogical overview of the notion see Simpson (2012).
4 See also the large list of references about trust in labour organizations available
at http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/Promalco_tool/productivity-tools/manual07/
m7_12.htm.
From a technical and technological viewpoint, trust is crucial in the context
of the design of secure systems in cyberspace. It is often defined on the basis
of some basic reputation algorithm and one of the main interests lies in defin-
ing relevant propagation methodologies and to constrain problematic properties
such as transitivity, see e.g. Beth et al. (1994); Christianson, Harbison (1997);
Kamvar et al. (2003); Guha et al. (2004).
Less explored, but certainly as much interesting, is the description of untrust-
worthy relations, i.e. relations qualified by a negative assessment of trust. In this
context, the first remarkable condition is a widely spread confusion concern-
ing the difference between distrust and mistrust. Such distinction is in general
ignored when the underlying conceptual schemas do not allow for a proper clarifi-
cation of the related notions (McKinght et al. (2000); Guha et al. (2004); Borgs et
al. (2010)). In particular, when trust is identified as a first-order relation, distrust
and mistrust relations cannot be understood as directly negative counterparts
of the former. In many approaches distrust is reduced to a low or zero degree
of trust (gans et al. (2001)), but the definition of distrust as direct negation of
trust (Abdul-Rahman,Hailes (1997); Chen,Yeager (2003)) induces ignorance of
the subtle semantic distinction with mistrust. In particular this is due to the fact
that the negation of the relation trust(A,B) (with A,B agents) as ¬trust(A,B)
means that no operation on content vs. epistemic state is possible, i.e. there is no
possibility to separate distrust in any message from a given agent and distrust
in some message. More interestingly, this makes it impossible to distinguish be-
tween not trusting purposefully false information vs. not trusting accidentally
false information. Moreover, many undesired effects occur, among which transi-
tivity obtained by multiplication: ¬trust(A,B) ∧ ¬trust(B,C) ` trust(A,C).
In Taddeo (2010) and Taddeo (2010a) trust is defined as a second-order
property characterizing first-order relations among agents. First and overall, a
trust assessment is not always and not only an assessment of the trustor on
the trustee; rather, it is a certain qualification of objective parameters (such
as the environment in which this relation holds) and it characterizes a specific
task evaluating the likelihood of achieving a specific goal. This evaluation can
be obtained by reference to similar cases, for authority arguments, or any other
chosen parameter. In order to conceptually capture this fine-grained sort of rela-
tion, the relation of trust can be modified from the basic first order trust(A,B)
to a second order trustA(ActionB). In this way, the trustor does not trust di-
rectly another agent but it rather trusts the operation that the trustee performs,
with the possibility of qualifying Action in various ways. For the epistemic con-
text generated by an information channel, trust qualifies the communication
trustA(InformationTransmissionB) between the receiver A and the source of
a certain information content B, or in a computational model between a client
and a server. In this case one says that the channel including those two termi-
nals and that specific information item is trusted.5 This understanding of trusted
5 Notice that while in the following we will be speaking of the actual information
transmission from Bob to Alice, the definition of trust as second order relation
does not in fact require the first order relation to be actualized: one could perfectly
communication is formalized in Primiero, Taddeo (2012) by a modal type the-
ory which accounts for the two epistemic states involved: verification-terms on
propositions for directly known contents, or information items available at both
ends of the channel; partial-terms for communicated but not verified (hence, to
be trusted) contents, or information items available only at one end and trans-
mitted to the other.6 Based on a model of trust as a second-order property of
relations, one can ground a more fine-grained conceptual analysis of distrust
and mistrust. The characterization of these notions will be obtained not as an
all-purpose definition, i.e. we shall not attempt to provide definitions of distrust
and mistrust as such. We will rather offer a more confined characterization of
distrustful and mistrustful relations, in particular for the context of epistemic
relations instantiated by channels of information transmission. We will refer in
the following to a modular characterization:
– an information transmission that generates uncertainty in the receiver con-
cerning the truthfulness of its content is untrustworthy ;
– an information transmission that is deemed to convey unintentionally false
information is mistrustful ;
– an information transmission that is deemed to convey intentionally false
information is distrustful ;
– a receiver that assesses an information transmission as mistrustful or dis-
trustful operates on its content accordingly.
Hence, our understanding of untrustworthy transmission will be based on the
characterization of the semantic behaviour of the agent who qualifies a channel
as distrustful or mistrustful. We are able to offer distinct procedural explana-
tions of such qualifications and will also consider some of the related properties.
Notice that our approach does not engage with the either rational or irrational
reasons or propagation algorithm that lead an agent or principal to assess the
trustworthiness of a channel with respect to an information item and another
agent or principal; irrespective of those reasons, we rather consider how the agent
behaves in view of such an assessment.
In the following we first characterize untrustworthy transmissions of either
complete or incomplete information (Section 2); we then offer a semantic anal-
ysis of untrustworthiness (Section 3) and then specifically of distrust (Section
3.2), mistrust (Section 3.1) and cases combining the two (Section 3.3); we con-
clude by offering an overview of the most relevant properties of untrustworthy
transmissions (Section 4).
well consider a property instead of a relation – like (GoodMathematicianB) and a
second-order property trustA(GoodMathematicianB), which would actualize in any
relation trustA(TheoremTransmissionB).
6 It is here important to stress how this notion does not coincide with that of reliance,
where one terminal relies on the other to perform some action without it knowing
it or not.
2 Untrustworthy transmissions
Alice and Bob met in London, had a great weekend together and now Alice is
preparing to go back to Brussels by train. Bob was given the task to check the
timetable and provide that information to Alice.7
Bob: ‘I checked the timetable, the train to Brussels leaves at 5pm’.
We consider this information transmission as a first order relation between Bob
and Alice: InformationTransmission(B,A). Alice realizes that Bob does not
remember that today the Railway Network updates to the Spring time. He is
transmitting unintentionally false information, or misinformation.8 Alice decides
to mistrust Bob’s transmission. Here the proper second order relation is at hand:
MistrustA(InformationTransmission(B,A)). How should she reason in view
of her assessment that the communication by Bob is mistrustful?
Moreover, Bob is deeply in love with Alice and wants her to miss the train
so that she will spend one more day in London.
Bob: ‘I regularly go to St. Pancras, the best way is to take a cab’.
This is again a regular first order relation InformationTransmission(B,A).
Bob is now telling her that the cab would be faster, while he knows the Tube
would be. He is transmitting intentionally false information, or disinformation.
Alice knows enough of London’s traffic jams to guess this is utterly false and she
decides to distrust Bob’s transmission. Here again, a second order relation is at
hand: DistrustA(InformationTransmission(B,A)). How should Alice reason
in view of her assessment that the communication by Bob is distrustful?
A different example stems from system design. Bob is a principal (either
human or automated)9 asking the bank server Alice for a list of the movements
on a given bank account number. To this aim, Alice requires Bob to provide a set
of identification data: the user’s birth date, a password and randomly generated
PIN code accompanied by the serial number of the generator. Bob offers back
three series of digits:
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:1103194 ;rvcs132RT43;324564-676544(source:343434)
The format of the first and second series are not valid, as the password should
include at least one symbol and the birth date misses a cipher. Can the server
recognize this as a case of unintentionally false data message and ask the client
to re-introduce the data? Assume instead that Bob is an attacker who is trying
to force Alice’s system by inputting the BIRTHDATE for a given user, trying to
guess the PWD and using the attacker’s own PIN generator to produce data for
source(KEY):
7 In the following examples, we will use italic fonts when referring to human agents,
and typewriter fonts when referring to mechanical principals.
8 See Floridi (2011).
9 In computer security, a principal is an entity that can be authenticated in information
transactions.
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:13061955;rtts?672TR21;434367-878799(source:898989)
In this case, the tentative attack on Alice’s system can be compared to sending
intentionally false information, in the sense that it is not a bona fide error: Bob
is offering data related to the user and combining it with a ‘false’ source for
the PIN. As in many systems known to us, after a fixed number of wrong tries
by Bob, Alice decides he is an attacker. How should Alice act in view of such
assessment? Can we devise a semantics of actions leading to blocking the client?
We start by considering a first-order relation of communication (between Bob
and Alice) characterized by second-order relations of mistrust and distrust.
Definition 1 (Information Channel). An information channel is the phys-
ical or virtual relation instantiated by a communication act between a Sender
S and a Receiver R such that a transmission of information contents from the
former to the latter occurs on it.
In the following, we shall refer to Bob as the Sender and to Alice as the Receiver.
To provide a closer characterization of the relation instantiated by communica-
tion between the Sender and the Receiver, we offer a more fine-grained definition
of the content transmitted by a communication act over an information channel.
Definition 2 (Complete Information Transmission). A complete informa-
tion transmission 〈Metadata,G〉 consists of the information metadata functional
to a goal G establishing that an information item A included in G is valid for the
current information channel.
The Metadata element in the transmission can be instantiated by various data,
depending on the system design and the target for which the communication
happens:
– a pair 〈procedure,G〉 will instantiate a system where a verification procedure
is required that justifies explicitly the validity of A in G, for example an
automated theorem prover;
– a pair 〈source,G〉 will instantiate a model of testimony, where the authority
of a client is supposed to suffice for the acceptance of the goal statement
A valid, e.g. by offering the originator of the train schedule, or the code
number of the random key generator;
– a pair 〈tags,G〉 will instantiate a system where the goal expression is ac-
companied by identifying tags, relative e.g. to a location or timing (‘updated
at 4pm’; ‘accessing from Brazil’);
– a pair 〈user,G〉 will instantiate a system where the goal expression is tar-
geted for specific user groups, e.g. a cryptographic message with the mention
of those users who have a specific decrypting key, or a scientific explanation
of some chemical targeted for farmers (and not for pharmacists).10
10 Such a schema 〈Metadata,G〉 seems particularly apt to enrich the dynamics of design
of online scientific databases so as to facilitate the selection of appropriate datasets
Our first task is to characterize untrustworthy information transmissions. A
complete transmission as defined above is trustworthy if its content is assumed to
include correct metadata and a valid goal. We will consider such a transmission
error-free and associate it with a certainty state in the Receiver about the content
A. Then an information transmission can be considered untrustworthy in a first
sense if its content is deemed prone to errors. Hence, we proceed by characterizing
information transmissions with errors:
Definition 3 (Transmission with errors). A transmission with errors is
such because:
– it includes incorrect Metadata relative to an information content A; the
Metadata is then considered non-processable;11
– it includes an invalid content A; G declaring validity of A is then considered
a non-attainable goal.
This allows us to design two models of error production, see also Primiero (2013):
1. wrong informational coupling : an error in building the pair 〈Metadata,G〉,
where Metadata is inappropriate (i.e. of the wrong type or semantically
non-apt to the task),12 though possibly well-processed and therefore correct,
relative to content A in G.
2. informational malfunctioning : an execution error by which the processing of
Metadata is incorrect for G; if executed correctly, Metadata is indeed valid
for content A in G.
Hence a communication is untrustworthy by errors if it generates uncertainty in
the Receiver about the validity of the goal or the correctness of the metadata.
Definition 4 (Untrustworthy Transmission of Complete Information).
An untrustworthy transmission of complete information is a ternary relation
holding between the epistemic state of the sender S, the epistemic state of the re-
ceiver R and the information 〈Metadata,G〉 such that the transmission by S gen-
erates uncertainty in R about correctness or validity of the pair 〈Metadata,G〉.
A (complete) transmission is thus deemed untrustworthy (second order) if the
Receiver considers possible that the Sender produces an error in her knowledge
state about 〈Metadata,G〉 (first order relation of communication).
Consider now some slightly modified versions of the above examples.
specific to the purposes of given users. For an analysis of the epistemological issues
related to this problem and the connected notion of distributed understanding, see
e.g. Leonelli (forthcoming).
11 The processing of metadata depends on its typology: for procedure it will be execu-
tion; for source it will be reachability; for tags it will be checking; for user it will
be targeting.
12 As an example, consider the pair 〈geotags,PWD〉 for identification on access re-
quests, where geolocalization is superfluous, while procedure or source would be
appropriate.
Bob: ‘The train to Brussels leaves at 5pm. The best way to go to St.
Pancras is to take a cab’.
While this information transmission appears correct, Bob is offering no reason for
his claims. As opposed to the above format of complete transmission, something
is now missing, namely the metadata procedure by which Bob would make his
claim valid. This case corresponds to a message of the form 〈procedure empty,G〉.
Similarly in the second example:
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:13061955;rtts?672TR21;empty(source:empty)
Here the principal is letting the required information about the PIN and serial
number of the code generator empty. This case corresponds to a message of the
form 〈source empty,G〉. We shall call cases of this form incomplete transmis-
sions.13
Definition 5 (Incomplete Transmission). A transmission is incomplete iff:
– it misses Metadata for G;
– it misses the goal G for which given Metadata is offered.
Accordingly, an information transmission can be considered untrustworthy in
a second sense if its content is incomplete, thus inducing again an uncertainty
state in the Receiver. We now proceed by characterizing incomplete information
transmissions as untrustworthy.
Definition 6 (Untrustworthy Transmission of Incomplete Information).
An untrustworthy transmission of incomplete information is a ternary relation
holding between the epistemic state of the sender S, the epistemic state of the
receiver R and the information 〈Metadata, empty〉 or 〈empty,G〉, such that the
transmission by S generates uncertainty in R about the validity or the correctness
of any pair 〈Metadata,G〉.
An incomplete transmission is hence deemed untrustworthy if the missing infor-
mation cannot be analytically extracted from the received data. Our task in the
following is to define the semantics of such untrustworthy complete or incomplete
transmissions.14
13 Converse cases of transmissions including metadata but no goal are also possi-
ble to formulate. An example would be a set of building instructions, or de-
ductive steps, that miss a declaration of the building task or the theorem:
〈procedure : R1, R2, . . .,G empty〉.
14 The present definition of untrustworthy transmission implies that mistrust and dis-
trust cannot be defined in absence of communication. In other words, one can judge
a source untrustworthy only with respect to a given information transmission. This
is an immediate consequence of defining trust as a second order property of first
order relations. Nothing, however, prevents from extending this framework in view
3 The Semantics of Untrustworthiness
Incorrectness or incompleteness are thus considered in the following the principal
conditions for an untrustworthy transmission. This notion of untrustworthiness
is further characterized as inducing uncertainty in the Receiver’s epistemic state
with respect to the information content of the transmission. Unfortunately, this
is only a static characterization of the Receiver’s state and it does not specify
in any way the consequent course of action of the Sender. On such a basis, the
only sensible specification would be to request suspension of any (complete or
incomplete) information transmission which is deemed untrustworthy. In other
words, Alice could only stop listening to Bob and ignore his messages; and the
server could only forbid further attempts at access by the client. This solution
appears highly unsatisfactory. Our aim in this section is to offer a more detailed
procedural account of the Receiver’s epistemic state involved in an untrustworthy
transmission, based on an intentional characterization of the Sender’s course of
action. Once Alice decides that Bob’s information transmission is mistrustful,
respectively distrustful, how should she reason on the basis of the information
she has been given? We shall analyse the semantics of untrustworthiness in view
of executable procedural steps when conditions of an untrustworthy complete or
incomplete transmission obtain and the intention of the Sender is assessed.
In the context of a semantic theory, information 〈Metadata,G〉 is true, mean-
ingful, data. Our characterization of untrustworthy information as incorrect, in-
valid or incomplete data makes it, by definition, false information from the point
of view of the receiver. The latter can be wrong in its assessment of the sender,
and thus wrongly consider the information as false. But, as the present treatment
proceeds from the viewpoint of the receiver’s judgment of the source’s reliability,
for as far as the definition of untrustworthiness is concerned, we are dealing with
false information. False information can be further identified in two intensional
versions: misinformation as unintentionally false information and disinforma-
tion as intentionally false information.15 In our model, this property necessarily
amounts to an assessment of the Sender’s intention by the Receiver, and we will
not make any claim about how reasonable such assessment is, nor whether it
is correct. Notice that the intentionality assessment by the Receiver does not
of memory-based agents who are able to assess trustworthiness of peers in view of
previous communications. Notice, however, that even in the present treatment, the
notion of (un)trust is not content-bounded, i.e. the formal treatment is not strictly
dependent on tokens of information: the definition uses a data/metadata structure
such that the assessment of untrustworthiness can be induced only by evaluation of
the sender’s properties.
15 For a complete analysis of a theory of strongly semantic information, see Floridi
(2011). According to such theory, information cannot be properly false. The problem
of the veridicality of information content has been long debated and it is not a settled
theoretical issue. For the present purposes, we shall not enter this debate and suffice
to say that, in the following, we understand ‘false information’ as tantamount to
false data with meaning. For the introduction of the notion of (un)intentionally false
information see also Floridi (2011, p.260).
mean that the model accounts only for conscious beings as Senders. It seems
reasonable to say that one way a machine can be said to transmit ‘intentionally’
false output data is if its program is meant to do precisely that, and that it
transmits ‘unintentionally’ false data if this is only the result of a malfunction-
ing. Another account of the intentionality of mechanical principals is the one
instantiated by our examples above: unintentionally false information is sent by
way of bona fide mistakes by authorized clients; intentionally false information is
sent by purposefully erroneous data intended to deceive another client or server.
Now we can characterize channels in view of transmission of intentionally and
unintentionally false information:
Definition 7 (Disinformative Channel). A disinformative channel trans-
mits intentionally false information contents from S to R.
Definition 8 (Misinformative Channel). A misinformative channel trans-
mits unintentionally false information contents from S to R.
Accordingly, we will characterize untrustworthy transmissions as being executed
on either a disinformative or on a misinformative channel. Notice that a dis-
informative channel is not defined by intentional transmission of false informa-
tion and, accordingly, a misinformative channel is not defined by unintentional
transmission of false information. (Un-)intentionality of the transmission is an
additional property that does not define the untrustworthiness of the channel.16
Our analysis will now specify the semantics of such untrustworthy channels
in terms of the possible procedures executable by the Receiver involved in a
transmission on either a mistrustful or distrustful channel, by way of specifying
the admissible rule steps.
3.1 Mistrust
A clear connection between misinformation and mistrust is formulated as follows:
Definition 9 (Mistrustful Transmission). An information transmission over
a misinformative channel is characterized by a second order property of mistrust.
To describe the logical behaviour of the Receiver involved in a mistrustful trans-
mission, we relate the second-order property of mistrust to an operation of modal
modification. A procedural semantics of modal modification can be informally
explained by the use of a modal operator: given a well-defined set P of terms
and the full formulation of conditions to be satisfied for a given term to be in
P , a modal operator produces the set of ‘possibly satisfied’ conditions for P ,
16 In fact, we can think of an unintentional transmission of intentionally false informa-
tion (e.g. the wrongful selection of a REPLY-ALL method in an email communication
to transmit a consciously formulated excuse to miss a meeting), as well as an inten-
tional transmission of unintentionally false information (e.g. the correctly addressed
email to my boss, where I claim I will be missing the meeting this Friday because of
a research workshop in Germany, while I meant in the UK).
i.e. the judgement that for at least one condition one cannot claim whether it is
satisfied or refuted. It thus induces the contingent truth of the construction of
a term in P , pending satisfaction of its condition(s). In this way, the inference
to the principle of bivalence, P ∨ ¬P remains valid, though not trivial as its
definition is reduced to a possibility operator. A classical example of a modally
modified expression is ‘alleged assassin’: it starts by defining an ‘assassin’ by
laying down the conditions c1, . . . , cn for an element of such a set to be con-
strued (what does it mean to be an assassin); then it modifies it by applying
the operator ‘alleged’, which generates for at least one of the listed conditions
ci the modal version possibly(ci), so that the obtaining of the property ‘being
an assassin’ remains open, depending on ci’s refutation or verification. A sim-
ilar analysis of the mistrust relation can be offered.17 Informally, mistrust can
be understood as the epistemic operation that, considering a certain content as
unintentionally false information, induces the contingent falsity of that content,
pending refutation. This should now be applied to our analyses of complete and
incomplete information.
Definition 10 (Mistrustful Complete Transmission). Assume a first-order
relation of complete information transmission 〈Metadata,G〉 between a source S
and a receiver R. The complete transmission so defined is characterized by the
second order property of mistrust if R thinks that S transmits unintentionally
false information and so infers that
1. Metadata is correct for some G′, or
2. G is valid with respect to some Metadata′, or
3. there is a valid pair 〈Metadata′,G′〉
The operation induced by this definition simply induces the identification of a
different pair 〈Metadata,G〉, which the Sender might have intended to trans-
mit. The informal meaning of such variation is that the Receiver assumes false
information is being sent unintentionally on the Sender’s side. The Receiver is
‘prepared’ to act accordingly by considering alternative elements in the transmit-
ted pair. There are two possible outcomes for the application of this operation:
– the new pair 〈Metadata′,G′〉 is formally the result of a subset operation on
the original 〈Metadata,G〉, i.e. the difference might be an issue of specifica-
tion, for example in the case of the following pseudo-coded ordering functions
on values (m,n), whose specification is contained in G in the form of the re-
quest to build a list of the values the function is applied to:
procedure := do Order(m,n);G := List(mn)
procedure′ := do Order(n,m); G′ := List(mn)
the ordering procedure′ subsects on procedure, in this case just by consid-
ering the inverted ordering;
17 See Jespersen, Primiero (2013), also for a brief overview of the literature in formal
semantics of modal modifiers.
– the new pair 〈Metadata′,G′〉 is formally the result of a negation operation on
the original 〈Metadata,G〉, i.e. Metadata′ is equivalent to ¬Metadata, and
G′ to ¬G, for example in the case
procedure := do Add(m,n); G := SUM(mn)
procedure′ := do Sub(m,n); G′ := DIFF (mn)
where the ordering procedure′ generates a complement operation of procedure.18
In the following, we shall use ◦S and ◦R to refer to the epistemic states of
the sender and the receiver respectively. These can be translated for example
in terms of epistemic or doxastic operators in any modal or first-order logic of
choice, or dependent typed language. The mistrust and distrust operators are
used as additional assumptions in introduction and elimination rules for the
negation operator over the content or over the epistemic operator. This gives
our language a procedural interpretation, typical for example of proof-theoretical
semantics. We shall abbreviate a mistrust property by R over a given information
transmission as mR. The mistrust operator mimics the behavior of the modal
modifier in the interpretation offered in (Jespersen, Primiero, 2013, sec.3). The
main inferential step induced in the Receiver’s state is then formalized as follows:
◦S〈Metadata,G〉 mR(◦S〈Metadata,G〉)
Mistrust¬ ◦R (〈Metadata,G〉)
The function mR behaves like a modal modifier, whose meaning is given by an
inferential step to a negated state about the 〈Metadata,G〉 pair; this in turn
means that the Receiver state ¬ ◦R (〈Metadata,G〉) accounts for a contingent
validity of alternative possible elements of the pair, according to one of the
following steps:
¬ ◦R 〈Metadata,G〉
◦R〈Metadata′,G〉
¬ ◦R 〈Metadata,G〉
◦R〈Metadata,G′〉
¬ ◦R 〈Metadata,G〉
◦R〈Metadata′,G′〉
The logical negation at work in these cases is indeed modal but not privative, in
that it does not distribute directly over the pair, it rather applies to the epistemic
state of the receiver, which in turn generates possible alternatives. Which of the
three cases above is effectively induced from the m operator is the result of an
assessment that might be quantitatively or contextually resolved by the Receiver.
In this sense, the present analysis accounts for first-time only transmissions and
it does not define any mistrust propagation procedure; a similar remark will hold
for the definition of distrust.
Let us reconsider our examples.
Bob: ‘I checked the timetable, the train to Brussels leaves at 5pm’.
18 The characteristic behaviour of a modal modification operation is precisely that of
oscillating between a subsective relation and a privative one: an ‘alleged assassin’
is an assassin (hence subsecting on the set of assassins by inducing one that is also
suspected to be one) or is not (hence inducing the privative case).
How does Alice reason by implementing one of the rules for modal modification?
Assuming, for example, that she believes Bob indeed checked the timetable, but
this was just before an update was due, her best course of action is to consider
the possibility that the train might not leave at 5pm.
Alice: ‘Bob checked before the update. The train might leave at some
other time’.
In the Server-Client example:
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:1103194 ;rvcs132RT43;324564-676544(source:343434)
Assuming the Server can recognize a missing cypher in the first entry and a
missing symbol in the second entry for an otherwise structurally correct message,
its best course of action would be to assume the request is authentic (i.e. it is
not an attack and does not require a plausible deniability reaction) and offer a
second try.
ALICE: Modify: Incorrect entry BIRTHDATE;PWD. Retry
We now proceed with the appropriate counterpart for incomplete informa-
tion.
Definition 11 (Mistrustful Incomplete Transmission). Assume a first or-
der relation of incomplete information transmission between a source S and a
receiver R. The incomplete transmission so defined is characterized by a second
order property of mistrust if R, when informed by S that
1. either 〈Metadata, empty〉, i.e. correct metadata but no goal is provided;
2. or 〈empty,G〉, i.e. a goal is valid but no metadata is provided;
thinks that S transmits unintentionally incomplete information, as S might
hold either a valid G or a correct Metadata, infers that
1. there might be a corresponding valid goal G for the transmitted metadata; or
2. there might be correct Metadata for the transmitted goal.
While mistrust on a complete transmission induces content change request (mod-
ify), the meaning of a mistrust state in view of incomplete information simply
amounts to content completion (request). The consideration that the Sender only
unintentionally transmits incomplete information leads the Receiver to establish
either the possible validity of some goal or the correctness for some procedure.
So the initial step is the Receiver assessing the incomplete transmission to be
unintentional:
◦S〈Metadata, empty〉 mR(◦S〈Metadata, empty〉)
¬ ◦R (〈Metadata, empty〉)
◦S〈empty,G〉 mR(◦S〈empty,G〉)
¬ ◦R (〈empty,G〉)
In turn, the Receiver’s reaction dictated by mistrust can be mimicked by the
following inferential steps:
¬ ◦R (〈Metadata, empty〉)
◦R〈Metadata,∃G〉
¬ ◦R (〈empty,G〉)
◦R〈∃Metadata,G〉
Let us see how this applies to our examples.
Bob: ‘The train to Brussels leaves at 5pm’.
Here Bob is giving again Alice some goal information, neglecting the procedural
aspect, the ‘how’ he knows. Here Alice can just assume that the information
might be unintentionally false.
Alice: ‘I do not know whether Bob has checked. I should check, then I
know when the train leaves.’.
In the Server-Client example:
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:11031946;rvcs?132RT43;empty(source:empty)
Assuming the Server recognizes the missing source on the random generated
code, in an otherwise structurally correct message, its best course of action
would be to assume the request is authentic (i.e. it is not an attack and does not
require a plausible deniability reaction) and offer to complete the data.
ALICE: Request:Source empty. Complete.
3.2 Distrust
In the present section we offer a focused analysis of either complete or incomplete
transmissions over disinformative channels. The connection between disinforma-
tion and distrust is formulated as follows:
Definition 12 (Distrustful Transmission). A disinformative channel is an
information transmission characterized by a second order property of distrust.
How to describe the logical behaviour of the Receiver involved in a distrustful
transmission? Our approach consists in analysing the second-order property of
distrust as an operation of privative modification on the content of the transmis-
sion. Privative modification for procedural semantics can be defined as a specific
kind of subsective operation: given a well-defined set P , it produces the set of
functions from elements p ∈ P to elements of the complement set ¬P . By look-
ing at such functions, one considers subsective predications over the set P that
induce the complement set. A classical example of a privatively modified case
is the expression ‘fake banknote’: it starts from the set of elements that share
the property of ‘being a banknote’; then it modifies it by applying the operator
‘fake’, which generates the set of non-banknotes (without actually including ev-
erything else, like horses and pens).19 The logical behaviour of the Receiver of
a distrustful transmission can be similarly formulated. Informally, distrust can
be seen as the epistemic operation that, considering a certain content A as in-
tentionally false information, induces the complement content ¬A, without this
inducing B’s and C’s.
Definition 13 (Distrustful Complete Transmission). Assume a first order
relation of complete information transmission 〈Metadata,G〉 between a source S
and a receiver R. The complete transmission so defined is characterized by a
second-order property of distrust if R, when informed by S that 〈Metadata,G〉,
thinks that S transmits intentionally false information and infers that
1. Metadata is correct for ¬G, or
2. G is valid with respect to ¬Metadata, or
3. there is a valid pair 〈¬Metadata,¬G〉
We shall also abbreviate a distrust property by R as dR. The distrust opera-
tor mimics the behavior of the privative modifier in the interpretation offered
in (Primiero, Jespersen, 2010, sec.3).The main inferential step induced in the
Receiver’s state is then formalized as follows:
◦S〈Metadata,G〉 dR(◦S〈Metadata,G〉)
Distrust◦R¬〈Metadata,G〉
The function dR behaves like a privative modifier, whose meaning is given by an
inferential step to the complement of the set generated by the 〈Metadata,G〉 pair.
Hence, in view of such operation, the meaning of the Receiver state ◦R¬〈Metadata,G〉
is further explained by one of the following steps:
◦R¬〈Metadata,G〉
◦R〈¬Metadata,G〉
◦R¬〈Metadata,G〉
◦R〈Metadata,¬G〉
◦R¬〈Metadata,G〉
◦R〈¬Metadata,¬G〉
The procedural explanation of distrust in view of complete information trans-
mission reduces to a pair of rules: negation introduction on content and negation
distribution over the content pair. Which of the three cases above is effectively
induced from the d operator is a question of assessment that might be quantita-
tively resolved depending on the number of previous cases of distrust involving
the given S and R: one can then devise a scale that maps the lower level of trust
in the Sender to the more complex case of privative modification (by establishing
e.g. that negating one element in the pair is less distrustful than negating both,
and that negating the goal is more distrustful than negating metadata); or the
assessment might be a matter of contextual or purely contentual evaluation.
Let us go back to our examples.
19 See Primiero, Jespersen (2010), also for a brief overview of the literature in formal
semantics for privative modifiers.
Bob: ‘I regularly go to St. Pancras, the best way is to take a cab’.
How does Alice reason by implementing one of the rules for privative modifica-
tion? Assuming for example that she does indeed know that Bob is acquainted
with travelling to St. Pancras, her best course of action is to deny the validity
of his goal statement.
Alice: ‘Bob regularly goes to St. Pancras, he knows the best way is not
the cab’.
In the Server-Client example:
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:13061955;rtts?672TR21;434367-878799(source:898989)
Assuming the Server recognizes the mismatch between the data on BIRTHDATE;PWD
and SOURCE, it might assume it is a random number generator attempting an
attack and so require a plausible deniability reaction:
ALICE: Access denied. Further attempts denied.
Let us now consider the notion of distrust in view of intentionally incomplete
transmissions.
Definition 14 (Distrustful Incomplete Transmission). Assume a first or-
der relation of incomplete information transmission between a source S and a
receiver R. The incomplete transmission so defined is characterized by a second
order property of distrust if R, when informed by S that
1. either 〈Metadata, empty〉, i.e. metadata is correct but no goal is provided;
2. or 〈empty,G〉, i.e. goal is valid but no metadata is provided;
thinks that S transmits intentionally incomplete information, as S does not
hold either a valid G or a correct Metadata and infers that
1. Metadata should not be considered correct; or
2. goal G should not be considered valid;
The meaning of a distrust state in view of incomplete information simply amounts
to disregarding the transmission considered. The informal idea is that the Re-
ceiver, upon reception of an incomplete message, assumes that the Sender is not
even rightfully transmitting what he knows, maybe only making up his mind
(and not even being able to do so completely) and in the worst case scenario
performing an attempt to attack without appropriate privileges. Though the
semantics of this case is slightly more complex to analyse, we can provide an ex-
planation which actually reduces to the previous format of distrust for complete
information transmission. The possible inference steps need to be formulated in
view of an appropriate understanding of the pairs 〈Metadata, ∅〉 and 〈∅,G〉. We
start with the negation introduction operation as defined above for complete
transmissions:
◦S〈Metadata, empty〉 dR(◦S〈Metadata, empty〉)
◦R¬(〈Metadata, empty)〉)
◦S〈empty,G〉 dR(◦S〈empty,G〉
◦R¬(〈empty,G〉)
Incompleteness of the transmission by missing metadata or a missing goal is to
be ascribed to a voluntary act of the Sender. Then, according to our distrust
operator, in the first case the Receiver refuses to assert validity for any goal
and, in the second case, refuses to assert correctness for any metadata provided.
In turn, the reaction dictated by distrust can be mimicked by the following
inferential steps:
◦R¬(〈Metadata, empty)〉) ◦R(〈¬Metadata,∀G(¬G)〉)
◦R〈¬Metadata,¬G〉
◦R¬(〈empty,G〉) ◦R(〈∀Metadata(¬Metadata),¬G〉)
◦R〈¬Metadata,¬G〉
Notice that in this case we do use negation introduction but not full distribution:
we simply consider the empty element as meaning that no element is available
and let distribute negation only over the element which actually occurs in the
pair. This reduces to the last case of distrust for complete information, i.e. full
information disregard.
Back again to our examples.
Bob: ‘The best way to St. Pancras is to take a cab’.
Here Bob is giving Alice some goal information, neglecting the procedural aspect,
the ‘how’ he knows. What is Alice’s best course of action when assessing that
Bob is sending intentionally false incomplete information?
Alice: ‘He gives no reason, I should trust none. The best way to the
station is not the cab’.
In the Server-Client example:
ALICE: Request:BIRTHDATE;PWD;PIN(SOURCE)
BOB: Enter:fffgggrrttt;323232rere;434367-878799(source:empty)
Assuming the Server recognizes the fully unstructured and incomplete message,
it might assume it is a random number generator attempting an attack and so
reject the given information and deny access:
ALICE: DATE:invalid; PWD:invalid: KEY:invalid; SOURCE:empty.
Access denied. Further attempts denied.
3.3 Mixed conditions
A variant case is when a composed message is assessed to be partly intentionally
false, and partly unintentionally so. An example would be the following complete
information transmission by S to R:
procedure1: I checked the timetable;
G1: the train to London leaves at 5pm.
procedure2: I regularly go to the station;
G2: the best way is to take a cab.
Assume that R assesses that both contents are false, but the first is uninten-
tionally so, because R believes S does not know the timetable was updated few
minutes ago; while the second is intentionally so, as it is known to R that S
knows the metro is faster. The appropriate inference is of the following form
◦S〈procedure1,G1 ∧ procedure2,G2〉
◦S〈procedure1,G1〉 mR(◦S〈procedure1,G1〉)
¬ ◦R (〈procedure1,G1〉)
◦R〈procedure1,G′1〉 ◦S〈procedure1,G1 ∧ procedure2,G2〉
◦S〈procedure2,G2〉 dR(◦S〈procedure2,G2〉)
◦R¬(〈procedure2,G2〉)
◦R〈procedure2,¬G2〉
◦R〈procedure1,G′1 ∧ procedure2,¬G2〉
In this example, the mistrust and distrust operator induce respectively modifi-
cation and negation over the goal only. Similar constructions can be offered for
the cases of incomplete information transmissions.
4 Some properties of untrustworthy transmissions
As our analysis of distrust and mistrust builds on the model of trust as second
order property characterizing the first order property of information transmis-
sion, in the following we will consider properties of untrustworthy transmissions
by comparison with properties of trusted communications. Such properties rely
on the formal analysis by modal frames given in Primiero, Taddeo (2012).
4.1 Reflexive untrustworthiness
In Primiero, Taddeo (2012), trusted communications are obtained by combining
in one language a weak truth predicate with a strong truth predicate: by the
latter, contents directly verified by an agent are claimed true; by the former,
contents for which a provability condition is not available for the agent are
declared non-refuted. A starting rule is defined that corresponds to reflexivity of
the trust relation, see Primiero, Taddeo (2012, Lemma 2): for every proposition
A that is non-falsified and for which the weak truth predicate holds, there is an
agent who assumes A by trust; this agent can, in particular, be the same whose
state accommodates an assumption on A. This can be further clarified out of the
formalism as saying that agents can trust themselves on contents for which they
have no refutation available. Can a similar reflexivity property be defined for
untrustworthy contents? Or in other words: given a content for which an agent
can assume A, can he proceed by untrusting A (thus, inducing either ¬ ◦ A for
mistrust or ◦¬A for distrust)? Satisfaction of this property would mean that for
any agent ◦A, the operations
◦A〈Metadata,G〉 mA(◦A〈Metadata,G〉)
Mistrust¬ ◦A (〈Metadata,G〉)
◦A〈Metadata,G〉 dA(◦A〈Metadata,G〉)
Distrust◦A¬〈Metadata,G〉
are admissible. Suppose that given ◦A〈Metadata,G〉 then ¬ ◦A (〈Metadata,G〉);
according to the interpretation given in Section 3.1, this means that in some
extension of the epistemic state A considers either Metadata′ or G′ or both true.
In case of ◦A¬〈Metadata,G〉, it means A considers ¬Metadata or ¬G or both
true. This semantics is thus clearly non-monotonic in view of the fact that the
content A is only weakly accepted (i.e. in the form of a possibility operator);
in particular, it should be possible to declare as false or as contingently false
a content that has been so far accepted as contingently true. It seems thus
reasonable that untrustworthy transmissions can be reflexive if the underlying
semantics accommodates a non-monotonic transition between epistemic state.20
4.2 Limited transitive untrustworthiness
A second provable property of trust relations in Primiero, Taddeo (2012, Lemma
3) is backward ordered transitivity: if a content A can be held true by agent k
trusting agent j, and j holds A true by trusting i, then k trusts i on A.21 Un-
trustworthy transmissions do not seem to relate so easily Senders and Receivers.
One aspect of untrustworthy complete transmissions is that they are typically
non-transitively iterated when the dR or mR operator is applied uniformly at all
passages, i.e. it is entirely explicit what the untrustworthiness is all about. To
show why this property holds for distrustful complete transmissions, the following
reasoning should suffice:22
20 Notice that this means that a standard upwards monotonic intuitionistic semantics
would, for example, not be feasible for this purpose. This is the reason why the
model for trust introduced in Primiero, Taddeo (2012), though intuitively based on
a verificationist semantics, extends the standard setting with a weak truth predicate
based on missing refutations. A full calculus for the latter is given in Primiero (2012).
21 Notice how this is the case for our treatment of trust as a second-order property
characterizing first-order relations of information transmission on specified contents.
Trust defined as first-order relation requires a restriction on transitivity, what is
called in the literature promiscuous trust.
22 In what follows we abbreviate Metadata with simply M for simplicity of reading.
Assume ◦i(〈M,G〉) and dj(◦i(〈M,G〉) about M; then ◦j(〈¬M,G〉). If dk(◦j(〈¬M,G〉))
about ¬M, then ◦k(〈¬¬M,G〉); hence, k could not distrust i: dk(◦i(〈M,G〉))
would not hold about M. Hence transitivity fails. Similarly, if dR would
apply to G or to both elements of the transmitted pair.
On the other hand, the same reasoning does not hold in general for mistrustful
complete transmissions:
Assume ◦i(〈M,G〉) and mj(◦i(〈M,G〉)) about M, then ◦k(〈M′,G〉); and if
mk(◦j(〈M′,G〉)) about M′, then ◦j(〈M′′,G〉); hence, mk(◦i(〈M,G〉)) might
still hold, if M′′ would not reduce to M. Similarly, if mR would apply to
G or to both elements of the transmitted pair.
Finally, transitivity is not in general applicable to untrustworthy incomplete
transmissions. Let us start with distrustful incomplete transmissions.
If ◦i(〈M, empty〉) and dj(◦i(〈M, empty〉)) about M, then ◦j(〈¬M,¬G〉); and
if dk(◦j(〈¬M,¬G〉)), then we are treating a case of complete transmission.
Assume that dk is now about ¬M, then ◦k(〈¬¬M,¬G〉); hence, dk(◦i(〈M, empty〉))
does not hold about M, but would in view of ◦k(¬G). This means that for
an incomplete transmission, distrust may iterate monotonically among
senders and receivers, depending on the qualification of the second dis-
trustful transmission. Similarly, if dR would apply to G, or to both ele-
ments of the transmitted pair or if the transmission would be of the form
〈empty,G〉.
For mistrustful incomplete transmissions, a similar case can be presented:
Assume ◦i(〈M, empty〉) and mj(◦i(〈M, empty〉)) about the empty goal,
then ◦j(〈M,G〉); and if mk(◦j(〈M,G〉)) we are again with a complete trans-
mission. Assume that mk is about M, then ◦k(〈M′,G〉); hence, mk(◦i(〈M,G〉))
still holds if M′ does not reduce to M (and it does not hold if the reduction
does). Similarly, if mR would apply to G or to both elements of the trans-
mitted pair. This means that an incomplete transmission may or may
not iterate monotonically (depending on reducibility of the completing
elements selected).
4.3 Symmetric untrustworthiness
Symmetry fails for trusted communications (Primiero, Taddeo (2012, Lemma
4)): if A is held true by agent j trusting agent i, it cannot be the case that A
holds true for agent i by trusting agent j. Similarly, untrustworthy relations are
not symmetric. 23 For the case of distrustful complete transmissions:
23 In the following, we will be using two obvious simplifications: that no double-games
are in place, and that the untrustworthiness assessments are public.
Assume ◦i(〈M,G〉) and dj(◦i(〈M,G〉)) about M, then ◦j(〈¬M,G〉); i can still
distrust j as he holds M in his initial message.24
Similarly for mistrust:
Assume ◦i(〈M,G〉) and mj(◦i(〈M,G〉)) about M, then ◦j(〈M′,G〉); then i
can mistrust j in any case and only distrust j in case M′ reduces to ¬M.
So it seems that in the case of complete information transmission, distrust and
mistrust can be symmetric. Let us consider the case of untrustworthy incomplete
transmission.
Assume ◦i(〈M, empty〉) and dj(◦i(〈M, empty〉)), then ◦j(〈¬M,¬G〉); i can
still distrust j in view of M, as he holds the opposite; in view of ¬G, if i
holds some G he can distrust j; if i holds truly empty, he cannot distrust
j on ¬G as for that he would need to hold G, which he does not. To the
purpose of reflexivity, is distrust on M sufficient.
For incomplete mistrustful transmission:
Assume ◦i(〈M, empty〉) and mj(◦i(〈M, empty〉)), then ◦j(〈M,G〉); M is irrel-
evant in this case; if i holds truly empty, then he will mistrust j on G and
if i holds some G′ there are three cases: either G′ reduces to G, then no
untrustworthiness is at stake; or it reduces to some G′′ different than G,
then he will mistrust j; or it reduces to ¬G and then i distrusts j. This
means that an incomplete transmission may or may not be symmetric
(depending on reducibility and on elements selected).
4.4 Expert untrustworthiness
Our model shows that distrust operations only apply on the basis of a sufficient
degree of expertise on the Receiver’s part. This is possible only in view of the
characterization of trust as second-order property, hence on the basis of the un-
derlying relation of communication transmission. The procedural explanation of
a distrust operation as a privative operator that negates partly or completely
the content of the transmission, requires at least sufficient competence on the
Receiver side about both metadata and goal. In a mistrust operation, however,
in which the procedural explanation in terms of a modal operator induces con-
tingency on metadata and goal, the Receiver’s expertise is not required: modal
modification admits anything from possibility to judgement suspension. Thus,
according to this model, a layperson with no specific competence is but able to
mistrust an expert; on the other hand, only an expert (to some sufficient degree)
can distrust the content of a transmission. Different types of expertise have been
24 A more powerful framework allowing us to express the reasons for untrust assess-
ments, would make it possible to formulate the reactions of i to j’s response to the
initial message. In this way, i’s further assessment could be dictated on the basis of
the correctness of j’s one. We leave this to further research.
identified by, among others, Collins, Evans (2002, p.254). Applying their three-
fold distinction between ‘no expertise’, ‘interactional expertise’ and ‘contributory
expertise’ to our account entails that a layperson who has ‘no expertise’ is un-
able to distrust an expert. Enough expertise to interact with scientists from the
field and carry out analysis (interactional expert) and/or enough expertise to
contribute to the actual field of science (contributory expertise) is required. Put
briefly: a layperson is unable to distrust an expert unless he or she can at least
be classified as an interactional expert. Although a clearly skeptical result, this
approach does differ from radical skepticism as offered by Frances (2005) and
Brewer (1998) as it shows in what instances a layperson is and is not able to
justifiably adjudicate expert testimony.25 A model in which (ir)rational reasons
behind assigning trustworthiness to relations are taken into account, could possi-
bly offer a different analysis. In particular, we can imagine a layperson qualifying
transmissions as distrustful on the basis of previous experiences with an expert’s
trustworthiness.
In the application to (secure) systems design, this property means that the
possibility to design a control system able to initialize different responses on the
basis of an assessment of the intentionality of false information received from a
client relies crucially on the expertise of the system with respect to the expected
input. Of course, any such system would have to match the input of any given
requesting client against the design criteria (e.g. the number of digits/symbols
present in PWD, the format of BIRTHDATE, the structural correctness of the PIN
string). This is not enough to define expertise as to discern between intentional
attacks and unintentionally mistaken entries. In our example, we have mentioned
some possible design criteria for defining this kind of expertise: for example, the
requirement that the server Alice overdrives the structurally correct BIRTHDATE
and PWD entries against a mismatching SOURCE entry, i.e. where the latter is not
coherent with the expected one in view of the user associated with the previous
two entries. In this case, the system is evaluating the latter condition as more
relevant to the first two, and hence assessing a distrust action rather than a
new attempt request. Combinations of such conditions might lead to a better
and more efficient system design of secure systems in view of trust and untrust
assessments.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of channels qualified by the transmission of either
complete or incomplete intentionally and unintentionally false information. We
have shown how such qualifications induce an appropriate understanding of the
notions of distrust and mistrust respectively. We offered a treatment of distrust-
fully and mistrustfully qualified transmissions in view of a procedural approach
25 Other, even more optimistic social epistemological attempts to deal with the problem
of adjudicating between rival experts are due to Goldman (2001) and Haack (2004).
However as suggested by Miller (forthcoming), they do not significantly enhance the
layperson’s epistemic arsenal.
that defines the former by a privative and the latter by a modal modification on
contents. We have explored how basic properties of reflexivity, transitivity and
symmetry behave for such channels. Applications are in expertise and secure
systems design. From here, we intend to develop a formal treatment of distrust
and mistrust operations for multi-agent and distributed systems, the study of
propagation relations, their properties and their identification in view of error
conditions and limited information availability. Moreover, we have considered
how our model of untrustworthiness operates in expertise contexts. From here,
we intend to offer a practical treatment of distrust and mistrust operations, in
the sense of critically examining the conditions under which experts and laymen
interact in real social contexts, a theoretical analysis of the criteria for better
secure systems design and how these relations are and should be informed by
(un)trustworthiness.
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